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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXII

ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
IN NONCRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
In both criminal and noncriminal proceedings, evidence is often obtained
through the employment of methods that are offensive to fair play, morally
reprehensible, and in many cases, illegal.' Nonetheless, under the common
law such evidence is admissible if it is relevant, offered in support of a fact
in issue, and otherwise competent.2 This common law rule of admissibility
may be circumvented only if the admission of the evidence would violate a
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the person against whom it is sought
to be used, or if the evidence was obtained in violation of a statutory prohibition. 3 The exclusion of logically and legally relevant evidence may therefore
be justified only by some overriding public policy expressed in the constitu4
tion or statutory enactments.
Various problems involving admissibility of illegally obtained evidence
have arisen.5 Although uniform treatment of such evidence in criminal actions
has been established,6 its acceptability and admissibility in noncriminal proceedings vary between jurisdictions and between each type of action involved.
This note will examine the treatment accorded illegally obtained evidence in
noncriminal matters, discuss and evaluate the rationale behind such varied
admission policies, and propose possible solutions to problems raised by the
examination. The areas to be discussed, although not exhaustive of the
problems, will include purely civil cases, forfeiture proceedings, administrative hearings, and juvenile cases.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN CRIMINAL MATrERS

Prior to Mapp v. Ohio7 conflicting rules prevailed in various jurisdictions
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
2. Id.; e.g., cases cited in 29 Ass. JuR. 2D Evidence §408 n.20 (1967).
3. See generally Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
In this case the government, after being ordered by the court to return both the originals
and all photocopies of business records that were illegally seized, sought to have those same
records subpoenaed. The Court, holding that the government could not use the information gained to call upon the owner in a more regular form to produce the records, indicated
that this would reduce the fourth amendment to "a form of words," and noted that: "[Tihe
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is not merely
that the evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not be
used at all." Id. at 392.
4. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939). The numerous Supreme Court
rulings dealing with the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence nowhere imply that the
wronged party's remedy extends to barring the action altogether. United States v. Blue, 384
U.S. 251, 255 (1966).
5. The term "illegally obtained evidence," as used in this note, refers only to that
evidence obtained by means of an unlawful or unreasonable search or seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. Problems involving
ascertainment of whether a particular search and seizure was unconstitutional are dealt
with in 13 F.A. JuR. Evidence §§181-83 (1957).
6. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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as to whether the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials was affected by
the fact that the evidence was obtained by means of an illegal search and
seizure. In the federal courts, the exclusionary rule was established by the
leading case of Weeks v. United States,8 which rested the rule upon the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures in the fourth amendment 9
and upon the guaranty of the fifth amendment against self-incrimination. 10
The Court concluded:"1
[T]he effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the
United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and
authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such
power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and
seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike,
whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and
effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system with
the enforcement of the laws.
Advocates of the extension of the exclusionary rule to noncriminal proceedings point to the italicized portion of the above opinion as the first indication
that the United States Supreme Court meant to include litigants in both
criminal and noncriminal matters within the protective sphere of the fourth
2
amendment' 2
Later decisions of the Court proceeded on the theory that the federal
exclusionary rule, as announced in Weeks, was announced in the exercise of
the Court's supervisory powers over the administration of justice in the federal
courts, and that the states were free either to adopt the federal exclusionary
rule or to follow the common law rule of admissibility. 3 The leading case
supporting the states' right of election is Wolf v. Colorado,4 where it was
held that a conviction in a state court for a state offense does not deny the
"due process of law" required by the fourth amendment solely because evidence was admitted that was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.' 5

8. 282 US. 888 (1914).
9. U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
10. It is well settled that, when properly invoked, the fifth amendment protects every

person from incrimination by the use of evidence obtained through search or seizure
made in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment. Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921).
11. 282 U.S. 88, 891-92 (1914) (emphasis added).
12. E.g., Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843, 846 (S.D. Ky. 1962).
18. Florida was among the many states to adopt the federal exclusionary rule. DeLancy
v. Miami, 48 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1950).

14. 388 U.S. 25 (1949).
15. While all the justices agreed that the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was enforceable against the states through the fourteenth
amendment, the majority proceeded upon the theory that such prohibition did not require
that it be enforced by excluding the evidence so obtained, because of other remedies available to the aggrieved party. Id. at 31. The dissenting Justices (Murphy, Rutledge, and
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Until recently, under the "silver platter" doctrine, evidence obtained by
state agents in an unreasonable search and seizure was admissible in a federal
criminal trial, providing no federal agent participated in the proscribed
conduct and the state officers did not act solely on behalf of the federal government. 16 In accordance with this doctrine, some states that had adopted
the federal exclusionary rule held that evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment by federal agents, without participation by state or local
officers, was admissible in a state court. 7 The silver platter doctrine was
overruled in 1960 by a 5-4 decision in Elkins v. United States,1 in which the
holding was based once again upon the Court's supervisory power over the
administration of justice in the federal courts.' 9
2'
Wolf v. Coloradowas overruled in another 5-4 decision by Mapp v. Ohio,
which held that as a matter of due process, evidence obtained by means of
an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment
was as inadmissible in a state court as it was in a federal court.2 1 This required all states to follow the exclusionary rule,'2 2 subject to state procedural
requirements governing the manner of collateral assertions in criminal prosecutions. It should be noted that nothing in Mapp required the states to follow
the federal standards of reasonable and probable cause for search.2 3 Although
the decision did not indicate whether the rule was to be applied retrospectively, the Court held in Linkletter v. Walker 24 that Mapp does not apply to
decisions that became final before the date of the Mapp decision.

Douglas) foreshadowed the Mapp decision by urging that the exclusionary rule be applied
in both federal and state prosecutions. Id. at 41. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 125 (1951), where the dissenting Justice again
urged that the exclusionary rule be extended to the states.
16. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); accord, Collins v. United States,
230 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1956); Watson v. United States, 224 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1955). The
"silver platter" doctrine was so named because of the rationalization that since the government had received the evidence as a gift, without actively seeking its procurement, it arrived
on a "silver platter."
17. State ex rel. Kuhr v. District Court, 82 Mont. 515, 521, 268 P. 501, 503 (1928); Johnson v. State, 155 Tenn. 628, 630, 299 S.W. 800, 801 (1927).
18. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
19. Eichner, The "Silver Platter"-No Longer Used for Serving Evidence in Federal
Courts, 13 U. FLA. L. Ray. 311, 321-22 (1960).
20. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21. Because the fourth amendment now offers protection against the uninvited ear, oral
statements, if illegally overheard, and their fruits are also subject to suppression. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
22. It is not specifically stated in Mapp v. Ohio that the states must discard the "silver
platter" doctrine. Cf. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
23. People v. Tyler, 193 Cal. App. 2d 728, 734, 14 Cal. Rptr. 610, 613 (1961). Two
years later Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the court in Ker v. State, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963),
asserted that the applicable minimum standard of what constitutes probable cause "is the
same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."
24. 381 U.S. 618, 636-38 (1965).
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25

CASES

Questions as to the use of illegally obtained evidence are not confined to
criminal cases, and no broad or general distinction has been made between
the use of such evidence in criminal and noncriminal proceedings. The Mapp
decision leaves undecided the question whether the exclusionary rule might
also be applied against evidence in a noncriminal matter. Various jurisdictions distinguish between evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and
seizure by government agents and the same evidence obtained in like manner
by one who is not a government agent.
Evidence Admitted if not Obtained by Government Agents
Cases decided both before and after Mapp have held that evidence obtained by means of an illegal search and seizure by persons not government
agents is admissible in civil actions. 2 6 In Sackler v. Sackler,27 a leading case,
the New York Court of Appeals held that evidence of a wife's adultery was
admissible in a suit for divorce notwithstanding its procurement through an
illegal forcible entry into the wife's home by the husband and several private
investigators. The court reasoned that there was no constitutional, statutory,
or decisional authority for rejecting this otherwise valid evidence. In interpreting Mapp as not controlling in civil cases, the court founded its assertion
on the historical roots of the fourth amendment, which was apparently
limited to "official acts and proceedings" and "invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the
28
privacies of life."
A recent Florida negligence case 29 held admissible a blood specimen taken
for a blood alcohol test from a person involved in an automobile accident
regardless of whether that person's consent was validly obtained. 30 In an
appeal by a wife from an order of the lower court vacating an earlier support
25. Forfeiture cases, administrative hearings, and juvenile cases will be treated elsewhere
in this note. Treated as civil cases will be domestic relations cases; negligence actions;
suits to abate nuisances; actions to recover stolen property; actions to recover customs
duties; and actions to collect unpaid income taxes. Many cases, because of difficulties in
classification, will overlap and will be treated in several sections.
26. E.g., Munson v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d 659, 166 P.2d 268 (1946); Giddens v. Cannon,
193 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1967); Sadder v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d

83 (1964).
27. 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
28. Id. at 43, 203 N.E.2d 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 85. In a vigorous dissent by Justice
Bergen it was argued that this procedural duality should not be sanctioned by the courts.
Justice VanVoorhis, in a separate dissent, asserted that Mapp does not specifically distinguish between civil and criminal actions and urged that the exclusionary rule be uniformly adopted by the state courts in all types of proceedings. Id. at 45, 203 N.E.2d at 488,
255 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
29. Giddens v. Cannon, 193 So. 2d 453 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
30. Judge Pierce, writing for the court, stated that he was nonetheless personally of
the opinion that such a decision violated constitutional guarantees under both the fourth
and the fifth amendments. Id. at 455, 457.
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order, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has accepted evidence of the wife's
adulterous behavior obtained by her husband by means of an unlawful entry
into her apartment.31 The court specifically stated that it knew of no authority
by which evidence obtained by private citizens is subject to the same constitutional limitations imposed upon government officials. 32
Evidence Admitted if Obtained by Government Agents
Although not numerous, there are some cases which hold that evidence
obtained even by government agents by means of illegal searches and seizures
may be admitted in civil cases on the ground that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies in criminal cases only.A
In Martin v. United States, 34 the court held that since a forfeiture proceeding
was not a criminal action, 35 the defendant could not validly raise the issue
of the legality of the search and seizure which resulted in the discovery by
government agents of evidence that they subsequently sought to introduce
against the defendant in the forfeiture action. In McColl v. Hardin,36 a suit
to close a dance hall as a nuisance, the court asserted that since this was not
a criminal action, a state statute prohibiting the use of illegally obtained
evidence (including, by implication, evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and seizure) was inapplicable.
Considerations Favoring Limitation of the Exclusionary Rule To
Criminal Matters
Some reasons for limiting the exclusionary rule to criminal proceedings
are applicable whether the evidence in issue was obtained by government
agents or private citizens. Our legal system does not generally attempt to
do justice incidentally or to enforce penalties by indirect means. Judges do
not attempt, in the course of a specific litigation, to investigate and punish
all offenses that incidentally may appear. The principle underlying the
admission of evidence wrongfully or illegally obtained is that the objection
to an offer of proof made at the trial raises no issues other than competency,
relevancy, and materiality, and the court cannot initiate a trial of collateral
issues as to the source of such evidence 7 Such a practice would offend our
31.

Commonwealth ex. rel. Young v. Young, 247 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1968).

32. Id. at 661. See also, e.g., Mercer v. Parsons, 95 N.J.L. 224, 112 A. 254 (1920);
Walker v. Penner, 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951).
33. E.g., Martin v. United States, 277 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1960); McColl v. Hardin, 70
S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Allison v. American Sur. Co., 248 S.W. 829 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923).
34. 277 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1960).
35. Federal decisions now almost without exception consider forfeiture cases as quasicriminal. E.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693
(1965). Martin v. United States, 277 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1960), nonetheless indicated the
court's permissive attitude toward admitting illegally obtained evidence.
36. 70 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
37. E.g., Cluett v. Rosenthal, 100 Mich. 193, 58 N.W. 1009 (1894); State v. McGee, 214
N.C. 184, 198 S.E. 616 (1938).
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system of law in several ways: first, it would amount to trying a criminal
action without the requisite complaint and attendant process essential to its
correct investigation; second, it would jeopardize the primary litigation by
delaying, confusing, and sometimes frustrating it; third, it does the foregoing
unnecessarily because the party disadvantaged by the use of such evidence
has more direct means of redress 3s and should not be permitted to adjudicate
his incidental complaint in this manner; and fourth, by rendering illegally
obtained evidence inadmissible in the primary litigation, the court would
of its own volition use the judicial rules of evidence as an indirect method
of punishment by improperly enlarging the penalty fixed by law, that of
fine or imprisonment, to include the forfeiture of some civil right through
39
the loss of the means of proving it.
It has also been asserted that a miscarriage of justice would result if convincing evidence of a party's improper
behavior were rendered inadmissible through the excessive zeal of an individual, whether officer or not, whose misconduct must be deemed his own act and
not that of the state. 40 However, the persuasiveness of this argument is somewhat diminished when it is used in connection with a noncriminal case.
The illegality by which the evidence is obtained is in no way condoned; it
is merely ignored in the principal litigation. 41
Evidence Excluded if Obtained by Government Agents
In many cases the courts, most notably federal courts, have ruled inadmissible in civil actions any evidence that was illegally obtained by government agents through an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the
fourth amendment.42 In Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States,43
the Supreme Court expanded the exclusionary rule to bar use of the knowledge that the Government had illegally gained by an unconstitutional search
and seizure of business records and prohibited the use of such information
even to describe the papers sought to be produced when drafting subpoenas
duces tecum. 44 Silverthorne has been interpreted as excluding the use of
illegally obtained evidence in any manner whatsoever in both civil and
criminal actions in the federal courts. 4 5 In Rogers v. United States,46 an action
to recover customs duties on imported liquors, the court, citing Silverthorne,
held that evidence obtained in a search with a warrant that was subsequently
held to be invalid was inadmissible. The court stated that "[i]f a writ of
subpoena is rendered invalid because of the use in framing it of evidence
obtained by the government in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we think
88. E.g., compensatory damages, punitive damages, criminal charges.
89. 8 J. WmaoaR, EvEDENcE §2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
40. State v. Turner, 82 Kan. 787, 794-95, 109 P. 654, 657 (1910).
41. 8 J. WIGMoaR, note 39 supra.
42. E.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v .United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Lassoff v. Gray,
207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965).
43. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
44. See note 8 supra.
45. Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691, 692 (Ist Cir. 1938).
46. 97 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1938).
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that a judgment in a civil cause, in the procurement of which evidence thus
illegally obtained is used, is likewise rendered invalid. ' ' 47 In a proceeding
that same year for permission for an alien to enter the United States, it was
specifically stated that evidence illegally obtained by immigration officers was
not admissible in a civil case in a federal court;' s significantly, the court here
limited the protection of this rule to the one whose personal rights were
violated. 49 In a 1949 case the Court held in a civil antitrust proceeding that
evidence obtained under an otherwise valid grand jury subpoena was admissible even though the grand jury was later found to have been improperly
constituted. 5° This fact did not of itself make the search and seizure of the
defendant's business records unreasonable, because the constitutional standards of probable cause had been satisfied. By implication, the Court reaffirmed
its posture regarding the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from all
federal courts.
Some state courts have embraced a similar attitude.5 1 On an appeal of
an injunction prohibiting plaintiff from maintaining a gambling nuisance,
the Alabama supreme court excluded from the civil case testimony of officers
who participated in a raid and search without a warrant.52 The testimony was
held inadmissible under a state statute that prohibits the trial court from
considering testimony that is "incompetent or is illegal . . . or is hearsay."'

3

The taking of blood for purposes of analysis from one who is unconscious
at the time has been held to constitute a violation of his constitutionally
guaranteed rights; testimony based upon such analyses has consequently been
excluded either in a criminal or civil action.5 The Georgia supreme court,
in another nuisance abatement case,n5 relied upon Mapp:5 6
[A]l1 evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court."
That this mandate was not for criminal cases only is clear from the
Mapp decision and from the more recent pronouncement in One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693.

47. Id. at 692.
48.

Schenck ex rel. Chow Fook Hong v. Ward, 24 F. Supp. 776, 778 (D. Mass. 1938).

49. In this case plaintiff was attempting to establish that he was the son of a deceased
United States citizen, where the citizenship of the deceased was stipulated. Letters tending
to prove that the alleged relationship did not exist were taken from the pocket of another
immigrant in the company of plaintiff. In refusing to exclude the evidence, the court
stated: "The protection is a personal one and can be availed of only by the person
wronged." Id. at 778.
50. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 799-800 (1949).
51. E.g., Carlisle v. State, 163 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1964); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144
S.E.2d 384 (1965); Lebel v. Swincicki, 93 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. 1958); Chambers v. Rosetti, 36
Misc. 2d 779, 226 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1962).
52. Carlisle v. State, 163 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1964).
53. ALA. CODE, tit. 7, §372 (1) (1958).

54. Ravellette v. Smith, 300 F.2d 854, 857 (7th Cir. 1962); Lebel v. Swincicki, 93 N.W.2d
281, 287 (Mich. 1958).
55. Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965).
56. Id. at 386.
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Evidence Excluded if not Obtained by Government Agents
At the other extreme of the continuum are cases in which all illegally
obtained evidence is excluded, notwithstanding the status of the party
causing its procurement. 57 In Williams v. Williams,5s an Ohio divorce
action, the court, applying Mapp to both civil and criminal actions without
distinguishing between public and private acts, held that certain letters that
were illegally seized by plaintiff were not admissible under the search and seizure provisions of both the federal and state constitutions. In Rocco v. Travelers Insurance Company,59 a New York case involving a double indemnity insurance policy, the court relied upon an earlier decision of the New York Court
of Appeals indicating that "[t]here can be no doubt that it is the duty of
the State courts to follow the Mapp holding in all trials taking place after
61
June 19, 1961."60 Interpreting this mandate, the court continued:
The language of the Court of Appeals enjoining State courts to follow
Mapp "in all trials" is unequivocal. Furthermore, it would seem that
there is no valid basis for different rules of admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence in criminal and civil litigation; evidence obtained
by search and seizure in violation of the constitution should be excluded in both types of actions.
In a New Jersey divorce proceeding, evidence secured by an illegal entry
into the correspondent's home by plaintiff and his private investigators was
62
suppressed, its inadmissibility being predicated largely on Mapp.
Considerations Favoring Application of the Rule in Noncriminal Matters
The rule that evidence or knowledge obtained by an illegal search and
seizure may not be used for any purpose is an extraordinary judicially imposed sanction limiting searches and seizures to those conducted in strict
compliance with the fourth amendment. 63 While the exclusionary rule and
the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures are
directed primarily against unlawful conduct by a government instrumentality,
certainly no individual has a greater power than the government itself.
Consequently, if federal and state governments are prohibited by the fourth
57. E.g., Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super, 305, 223 A.2d 217 (1966); Rocco v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 38 Misc. 2d 311, 238 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963), aff'd, 20 App. Div. 2d 251, 247
N.YS.2d 246 (4th Dep't 1964); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622
(CP. Ohio 1966).
58. 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. Ohio 1966).
59. 38 Misc. 2d 311, 238 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
60. People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 370, 179 N.E.2d 478, 480, 223 N.YS.2d 462, 464
(1961).
61. Rocco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 38 Misc. 2d 311, 314, 238 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (Sup. Ct.
1963). The court found it unnecessary to pass on this question, however, because it was
satisfied that the evidence in dispute was not obtained by an illegal search or seizure.
62. Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 805, 306, 223 A.2d 217, 218 (1966).
63. United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 796 (1949).
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and fourteenth amendments from using the illegally seized evidence in a
judicial proceeding against the party whose property has been illegally taken,
an individual so seizing such property should not be accorded a greater
privilege.6 4 Maintaining that the continued sanction of the duality of treatment of illegally obtained evidence in criminal and civil matters will result
in a procedural incongruity, which will eventually have to be adjusted,
Justice Bergen of the New York Court of Appeals has declared that a change
should be made in the direction of consistency while the criminal law is
still adjusting to Mapp, because "[t]he change in fundamental viewpoint and
the approach to wrongfully obtained evidence have made our rule of admissibility in private cases inconsistent and discriminatory."6 5 Dissenting separately in the same case, Justice VanVoorhis read Mapp as making no distinctions between civil and criminal actions, nor between whether the illegal
search and seizure was made by a government agent. "In fact," he asserts,
"there is no such thing as an illegal search and seizure by a public officer
as such, inasmuch as our fundamental law regards him under such circumstances as having stepped out of his role as a public official and become
a trespasser. -66
7
Limitations on the Exclusionamy Rule r

The general rule under which evidence obtained by an unlawful search
and seizure is inadmissible against the person from whom it has been wrongfully taken does not extend to a situation where such evidence has been
admitted for purposes of impeachment of that party when he voluntarily
testifies.65 One who voluntarily testifies and admits possession or ownership
of the property seized is deemed to have waived his constitutional guarantees
and can no longer object to its introduction into evidence on the ground
of illegal seizure59 Once such waiver is given, the evidence illegally obtained
is admissible not only in the proceeding in which the guaranty is waived,
but in all subsequent proceedings in which it may be material.70 It is
necessary for an individual who desires evidence obtained illegally to be
64. Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 162, 221 N.E.2d 622, 626 (C.P. Ohio 1966).

65. Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 47-48, 203 N.E.2d 481, 485, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 89
(1964) (dissenting opinion).
66. Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 45, 203 N.E.2d 481, 484, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86 (1964)
(dissenting opinion).
67. Although these limitations are usually spoken of when discussing the rule as it
applies to criminal prosecutions, they will apply with equal force in appropriate situations
in civil proceedings.
68. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1954). It is currently unsettled whether
this exception to the exclusionary rule will operate where the owner of the wrongfully
taken property is forced onto the stand in a civil case.
69. Burks v. State, 194 Tenn. 675, 678, 254 S.W.2d 970, 971 (1953); McCain v. State, 363
S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex. Grim. App. 1963). If the wronged party does not admit ownership
of the wrongfully seized evidence and objects to its introduction, its use is limited to impeachment only.
70. City of Chicago v. Lord, 3 Ill. App. 2d 410, 416, 122 N.E.2d 439, 442 (1954), af'd,
7 Ill. 2d 379, 130 N.E.2d 504 (1955).
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excluded to make a timely objection to its introduction; otherwise the right
to do so is forfeited.7 1 In most jurisdictions such objections are timely only
if they are made by a pretrial motion to return the property or suppress
the evidence.7 2 This is to forestall the necessity of stopping during the course
of a trial to determine the collateral issue of the legality of the means'by
3
which the evidence was obtained.7

QUASI-CRIMINAL CASES

Special problems in connection with the reception of evidence obtained
by a wrongful search and seizure are presented by proceedings for penalties
or forfeitures that, while civil in form, are criminal in substance. These
actions are often characterized as quasi-criminal, and the illegal search and
seizure is almost without exception accomplished by government agents.
Generally, evidence so obtained will be suppressed on the ground that its
reception would violate fourth amendment privileges. 74
In Ex parte Jackson,7 5 petitioner, who was being held for deportation
as an undesirable alien, was granted a writ of habeas corpus because the
mode of procurement of the evidence against him in the deportation proceedings violated the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches
and seizures and of due process. In an equity proceeding by a taxpayer to
restrain the collection of wagering taxes, 76 plaintiff, who denied being.in the
business of accepting wagers, asserted that since the government's contention
to the contrary was based in its entirety upon the testimony of agents who
had illegally raided plaintiff's premises under a defective warrant, such
testimony should be excluded.77 The court declared that .despite the civil
form of the action, the contested evidence should be suppressed. Relying on
Boyd v. United States,78 it held that since the government could not use the
illegally obtained evidence directly, neither would it be allowed to bring it
through the back door by means of asserting a civil liability in the nature of a
tax deficiency based upon the same information obtained in the illegal search
and seizure.79
71. See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
72. See, e.g., State v. Davidson, 248 La. 161, 177 So. 2d 273 (1965); People v. Maixhausen,
204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557 (1919); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 584, §11 (b) (1956).
73. People v. Heibel, 305 Mich. 710, 713, 9 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1943); State v. O'Brien, 252
S.W.2d 357, 359 (Mo. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 929 (1953).
74. E.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pa., 380 U.S. 693 (1965);
Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d
384 (1965); Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne, Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 615,
262 N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d Dep't 1965).
75. 263 F. 110 (D. Mont.), appeal dismissed sub nom., Andrews v. Jackson, 267 F. 1022
(9th Cir. 1920).
76. Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
77. Criminal charges arising from this illegal raid were subsequently dismissed. Id. at
845.
78. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
79. Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843, 848 (W.D. Ky. 1962). The court said, however,
that the same evidence which was inadmissible to prove directly that the plaintiff was
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In Carson v. State,80 a proceeding to abate gambling as a public nuisance,
evidence procured under a search warrant that was later held to be defective
was excluded on fourth amendment grounds.1 In a civil action by a municipality to recover penalties for violations of zoning regulations," 2 the court
explicitly noted that while such penalties are litigated in civil actions, the
action is quasi-criminal in nature and involves a direct form of punishment
for an infraction of the law. The court stated that "[t]he term 'penalty'
involves the idea of punishment, whether by a civil action or a criminal
prosecution. . . . A suit for a penalty is within the constitutional rule
excluding evidence unlawfully obtained."' ' s
FORFEITURE CASES

It appears settled today that proceedings for the forfeiture of property
that is not by its nature contraband 84 are sufficiently analogous to criminal
proceedings to justify the extension of the protection of the fourth amendment to the owner of the property. Therefore, evidence obtained by an illegal
search and seizure, when properly objected to, will be suppressed in such
cases. 15 The United States Supreme Court, in a state-instituted proceeding
for the forfeiture of an automobile found by state beverage agents to contain
illegally transported liquor after they had stopped and searched the car
without a warrant, extended the exclusionary rule of Mapp to forfeiture
proceedings.86 This holding was based on the ground that despite the
technical classification of such matters as civil proceedings, they are criminal
in substance and effect and therefore subject to the standards imposed by
the fourth amendment. The fact that forfeiture proceedings require a
determination that the criminal law has been violated, and that forfeiture
may, of itself, result in even greater punishment than a criminal prosecution,
compels this conclusion8 7 The matter of admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence in forfeiture proceedings was previously somewhat uncertain because

engaged in the business of accepting wagers was admissible to impeach plaintiff's testimony
that he was not engaged in that business, citing as authority Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954).

80. 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965).
81. Id. at 304, 144 S.E.2d at 387. The same result was reached in another case involving
abatement of a gambling nuisance where the testimony of officers who participated in a
warrantless raid was excluded from the related civil action. Carlisle v. State, 163 So. 2d 596
(Ala. 1964).
82. Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. Laverne, Inc., 24 App. Div. 2d 615, 262
N.Y.S.2d 622 (2d Dep't 1965).

83. Id. 262 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
84. As to the question whether, where illegally seized evidence is suppressed, it can be
returned to the owner if it is contraband or forfeitable, see Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699 (1948), overruled, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
85. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pa., 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
86. Id. This rationale was first presented by Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
87. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pa., 380 U.S. 693, 701 (1965).
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of conflicting decisions in the federal courts,88 but the confusion has now
been resolved by this decision.8 9 Because of the emphasis on the quasicriminal aspects in nearly all forfeiture cases, there arises an implication that
had the proceedings been purely civil in nature, the evidence would not
have been excluded.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Although no definitive generalizations may be made in the area of
administrative proceedings, the adoption of Mapp's exclusionary rule is fast
becoming de rigueur.90 This is especially so in cases involving federal agencies. 91 The federal judiciary has scrupulously attempted to exclude illegally
obtained evidence from administrative hearings. As early as 1920, certain
pamphlets that were procured in an unlawful raid and which were subsequently used in a deportation proceeding were held to be inadmissible. The
court maintained that "the deportation proceedings are unfair and invalid,
in that they are based upon evidence and procedure that violate the search
and seizure and due process clauses of the Constitution." 92 In Knoll Associates, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,93 an appeal from a proceeding
before the Federal Trade Commission against the corporate owner of the
stolen evidence, the court said that the Commission's use of such evidence
rendered unenforceable its order that the corporation cease and desist from
practices violative of the Robinson-Patman Act. 94 This case represents a
significant deviation from former decisions, for here the illegally obtained
documents were not procured by government agents, but were stolen by a
disgruntled employee of the corporation's sales representative for use in the
then-pending proceedings against the corporation. The court, holding that
such theft of the documents and the attendant use thereof by the Commission
was equivalent to an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning
of the fourth amendment, concluded that the use of the evidence for the
purpose of helping a government instrumentality enforce the law did not
justify the taking.9 5 The exclusionary rule also applies to proceedings before
88. Compare, e.g., United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1949), with United
States v. One 1956 Ford 2-Door Sedan, 185 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Ky. 1960).

89. It should be noted that the mere fact that forfeitable property was obtained by
the Government as the result of an unauthorized or illegal taking does not preclude its
forfeiture. E.g., Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530 (1926); United States v. One 1960
Lincoln Two Door Hard-Top, 195 F. Supp. 205 (D. Mass. 1961); State ex rel. Brett v. Four
Bell Fruit Gum Slot Machines, 196 Okla. 44, 162 P.2d 539 (1945).
90. E.g., Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners, 241 Cal. App. 2d 246, 260, 50 Cal. Rptr.
304, 315, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1966); Malik v. New York State Liquor Authority, 30
App. Div. 2d 1040, 294 N.Y.S.2d 948, 949-50 (4th Dep't 1968). But see Barnes v. State,
274 Ala. 705, 151 So. 2d 619 (1963).
91. E.g., Knoll Associates, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968).
92. Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. 110, 112-13 (D.Mont. 1920).
93. 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968).
94. Id. at 534; Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §13 (a) (1964).
95. The court, relying here on Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), asserted
that while Gambino involved a criminal prosecution, its holding would apply a fortiori to
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the Tax Court, 96 as well as to other parts of the executive branch of the

federal government. The rule has also found application in the legislative
function. At the Senator Dodd hearings before the Senate Ethics Committee,
it was ruled that certain documents illegally seized by a former aide of the
97
Senator were not admissible into evidence against him.

Although some state administrative boards have adopted the exclusionary
rule, its acceptance in this area is not nearly so widespread as in the federal
agencies. In a petition to review an order of the state liquor board suspending
plaintiff's alcoholic beverage license for permitting gambling on the premises, 98 the court held that evidence that had previously been suppressed at
the criminal trial of the gambling charge on the ground that no probable
cause for arrest without a warrant existed, thus making the search incidental
thereto illegal, was also incompetent in the accompanying administrative
proceeding and could not be used to support the liquor board's determination.
A California court has held that whatever the label attached to the proceeding, if its purpose is deterrent in nature, there exists a close identity
to the aims and objectives of criminal law enforcement. 99 As a matter of
policy, the same exclusionary rules should apply whether the proceeding
contemplates the deprivation of one's liberty or operates through some other
method of forcing compliance with the criminal law. It is noteworthy that
in most state cases involving the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
from administrative proceedings the reviewing courts based their exclusion
upon either the deprivation of a license, which is regarded as a property
right,100 or the enforcement of the criminal law in an indirect manner
through the imposition of forfeitures, penalties, and other sanctions.101 A
contrary view was adopted in Barnes v. State,10 2 a proceeding before a state

board of medical examiners seeking to have a license granted under a reciprocity statute. It was held that in the absence of a statute to the contrary,
administrative boards "might consider evidence of probative force even
though it may be hearsay or otherwise illegal."'0'
Very little legislation has been enacted concerning the admissibility of
illegally obtained evidence in administrative proceedings. For the most part,
the proceeding in the instant case. 397 F.2d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1968).
96. See generally COMMERtCE CLEARING HousE, INC., WHEN YOU Go TO THE TAX COURT
(21st ed. 1967).

97.

SENATE

DODD OF

COMM.

CONNECTICUT,

ON

STANDARDS

AND

CONDUCT,

INVESTIGATION

OF

SENATOR

THOMAS

J.

S. REP. No. 193, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1967).

98. Malik v. New York State Liquor Authority, 30 App. Div. 2d 1040, 294 N.Y.S.2d 948,
949-50 (4th Dep't 1968); accord, LaPenta v. New York State Liquor Authority, 30 App. Div.

2d 1033, 294 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948 (4th Dep't 1968).
99.

Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners, 241 Cal. App. 2d 246, 260, 50 Cal. Rptr. 304,

315 (1966).
100. Id. at 260, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
101. Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25 App. Div. 2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433, 440
(lst Dep't 1966): "The exclusionary rule rests on a theory of deterrence; that policy would
not be served if the illegal official activity could be used, despite unavailability in criminal
proceedings, to effect parallel sanctions of forfeiture in an administrative proceeding."
102. 274 Ala. 705, 151 So. 2d 619 (1963).
103. Id. at 712, 151 So. 2d at 625. This holding is contrary to the weight of authority.
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state statutes treating this problem are couched in terms of admitting "the sort
of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the 6onduct of serious affairs."104 These same statutes often have an accompanying
clause that specifically provides that the rules of admissibility applicable
in court proceedings, 105 and in some cases those rules provided by statute, 0 6
shall not be controlling in administrative proceedings. Ohio, in a statute dealing with judicial review of administrative rulings, allows the court to affirm
only if it finds "that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law."107 It is currently unclear
whether this would preclude an administrative agency from considering
illegally obtained evidence. If properly challenged in a judicial appeal from
an administrative proceeding, it seems likely that statutes permitting administrative agencies to consider evidence not admissible either under the common
law or some statutory prohibition, could be found unconstitutional or
limited in application to proceedings that are purely civil.108
JUVENILE CASES

Since the landmark Gault decision,109 standards of constitutional protections afforded juveniles have been in a state of transition. Both before and
since Gault, the trend has been to exclude illegally obtained evidence from
juvenile proceedings. In re Marsh,"0 a delinquency petition in which a
sixteen-year-old boy was charged with violating the terms of his probation,
dearly proclaims the treatment required by Gault to be accorded illegally
procured evidence in juvenile matters:""
Mor purposes of eliminating uncertainty in future cases, we have
considered this issue and hold that the exclusionary rules required
by the fourth amendment's prohibition against illegal search and
seizures are applicable to proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act.
Even prior to Gault most courts held that the procedures of evidence,
including the exclusionary rule, should not be relaxed for juveniles." 2 On
the contrary, judges were often of the opinion that the exclusionary rule
should be equally applicable to a juvenile who, by reason of his immaturity,
104. ALASKA STAT. §44.62.460(d) (1966); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, §I1 (2) (1966); R.I.

GEN. LAws ANN. §42-35-10 (1967).
105. ALAsKA STAT. §44.62.460 (d) (1966); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, §11 (2) (1966)" PA.
STAT. tit. 71, §741.807 (1962); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. §42-35-10 (1967).
106. ALASKA STAT. §44.62.460 (d) (1966); PA. STAT. tit. 71, §741.807 (1962) (by implication).
107. OHIO Rv. CODE §119.12 (1967).
108. This would exclude forfeiture of property rights or quasi-criminal actions.
109. In re Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
110. 40 Ill. 2d 53, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968).
111. 237 N.E.2d at 531; ILL. R-v. STAT. ch. 37, §§701-1 et seq. (1967). After examining
the legality of the search and seizure in the instant case, the court held that the juveniles

constitutional protections had not been abridged.
112. E.g., In re Sanders, 96 N.W.2d 218 (Neb. 1959); State v. Lowry, 95 N.J. Super.
307, 230 A.2d 907 (1967); In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Family Ct. 1966).
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stands in greater need of protection against infringements of his constitutional
rights than an adult.1

3

The courts of various jurisdictions have taken two distinct approaches
to this problem, but have nonetheless managed to reach the same conclusion
on the applicability of the exclusionary rule. In re Ronny,,1 ' a New York
juvenile proceeding, held that in respect to unconstitutional searches and
seizures, New York's juvenile proceedings: 11
[A]re not "civil." They are perhaps, for this purpose, "quasi-criminal"
in character. .

.

. Young persons have the same constitutional rights

as older ones in delinquency and supervisory jurisdiction, except the
right to a jury trial, which is balanced by our circumscribed power
and the confidentiality here maintained in an effort to keep the record
of a child unblemished.
The other approach is embraced by the courts of New Jersey. In a proceeding on a motion to suppress evidence in a juvenile hearing the court
held that the constitutional mandate of the fourth amendment is a "fundamental right of all persons regardless of age." 11 6 The court asserted that the
reason some basic constitutional rights afforded persons involved in criminal
prosecutions were not equally applied with respect to juveniles was that
the juvenile court was established under a guardianship philosophy. 1 7 The
court then held that the fourth amendment, not limited to persons accused
of crimes, should be interpreted to be applicable to all persons in accordance
with its terms. This approach renders the vehicle of due process unnecessary
in granting that protection to a juvenile.118 Under either method of rationalization, however, the juvenile is accorded similar protections against evidence
obtained in contravention of the fourth amendment.
THE EXCLUSIONARY

RULE IN FLORIDA

Although by virtue of Wolf v. Colorado"9 the original federal rule of
exclusion was not binding on the states, Florida was one of a minority of
states that by judicial decision anticipated Mapp and made the federal rule
113. In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (Family Ct. 1966).
114. 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Family Ct. 1965).
115. Id. at 210, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61.
116. State v. Lowry, 95 N.J. Super. 307, 313, 230 A.2d 907, 909 (1967).
117. Id. at 313, 230 A.2d at 909. The theory is that the interests of both society and
the minor would be adequately served by a solicitous attitude in the juvenile's care and
training.
118. Id. at 313, 230 A.2d at 909-10. "[T]he Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments [are]
constitutional protections afforded persons involved in criminal proseceutions [sic], thereby
necessitating their application to a juvenile proceeding (non-criminal in nature) through
the concept of due process. But the Fourth Amendment, not limited to persons accused of
crime, should be interpreted to be applicable to all persons in accord with its terms,
thereby rendering the media of due process unnecessary in granting that right to a
juvenile."

119.

338 U.S. 25 (1949).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 3
1969]

ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

applicable in state cases as well. 120 This stance was predicated upon both the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and the corresponding
section in the state constitution.121 Consequently, the impact of Mapp v. Ohio22
was scarcely felt in Florida. The novelty of the Mapp decision in states such
as Florida was in the implication it carried concerning the necessity of
adhering to federal interpretations 23 defining which searches and seizures
are reasonable or unreasonable. 2 4 While this question is left initially to the
state trial courts' determination, the reasonable search and seizure standards
of the federal judiciary are necessarily the minimum measure of due process
of law binding upon the state courts under the fourteenth amendment. 12 It
should be noted that a search illegal ab initio is not made lawful by what
26
is found in consequence thereof.
Although Florida has firmly adhered to the rule in the criminal area,
there are no reported Florida decisions applying the exclusionary rule to
noncriminal proceedings. In Giddens v. Cannon' 27 the court held the results
of a blood test admissible in a negligence action irrespective of whether
consent is given, withheld, or expressly denied. 128 Although it appears that
the court is indicating that the exclusionary rule has no application in civil
matters, such is not the case. It is significant that the court without exception
based its acceptance of the evidence on similar situations that arose in
criminal prosecutions where the same result obtains despite the applicability
of the exclusionary rule in such cases.' 29 Therefore, the issue of the application of the rule to noncriminal proceedings was never reached. Although the
exclusionary rule has not been applied in civil cases in Florida, neither has
any case to date expressly held the rule inapplicable.
A provision in the 1968 Florida Constitution provides that evidence
obtained in violation of the right of the people to be secure against

120.
So. 401
121.
122.
123.

E.g., Weiner v. Kelly, 82 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1955); Soloman v. State, 115 Fla. 310, 156
(1934); Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134, 113 So. 704 (1927).
FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §22 (1885).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
This was settled two years later in Ker v. State, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963). See note

23 supra.
124. S. GARD, FLORIDA EVIDENCE rule 445 (1967).

It appears that the standards must

meet the requirements of the fifth amendment in order to meet what are now the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
125. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-08 (1965), holding that evidence
obtained under a search warrant is not legal unless the warrant was supported by some

underlying circumstances sufficient to sustain the issuing magistrate's finding of reasonable
cause to believe that the search was justified.
126. Kraemer v. State, 60 So. 2d 615, 616 (Fla. 1952).
127. 193 So. 2d 453 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).

128. Id. at 455.
129. Admission of such blood tests in criminal cases was predicated upon the rationale

that the interest of society in determining intoxication was more important than the right
of an individual that his person be held inviolable. Since the exclusionary rule did not

apply to this situation in criminal cases, its applicability to civil cases was moot. But see
note 30 supra.
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130
unreasonable searches and seizures "shall not be admissible in evidence.
While this new language may be interpreted by the courts as including both
criminal and noncriminal actions, it is not likely that this will occur. The
expected result would be a limitation of the exclusion of such evidence to
criminal cases only, just as the similarly open-ended protection against the
unreasonable search and seizure itself has been applied only to criminal cases.
A motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence in Florida criminal
cases ordinarily must be presented to the court within a reasonable time
prior to the trial, or the objection will be waived. 131 This procedural requirement seems ineffectual, however, because once made, the motion need not
be heard before trial; 132 if heard at trial, it need not be heard out of the
presence of the jury. 133 In addition, where a pretrial motion to suppress
has been overruled, objection to the introduction of the evidence must be
made at the trial in order to preserve for the record the claim that it was
illegally obtained. The preliminary interposition of a motion to suppress
prior to the trial is not tantamount to a proper and seasonable objection to
the challenged evidence at the trial.134
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Many cogent reasons have been postulated favoring the exclusion of all
illegally obtained evidence from noncriminal proceedings. On the constitutional level, it has been urged that our entire political and social structure
rests upon the cornerstone that all men have certain basic rights that are
inherent and inalienable," 35 and that exist notwithstanding a lack of specific
enumeration in state constitutions. 136 "The rights of the individual are not
derived from governmental agencies, either municipal, state or federal, or
even from the Constitution. They exist inherently in every man, by endow",37
ment of the Creator, and are merely reaffirmed in the Constitution ...
From this beginning, the fourth amendment's protection is extended to all
persons, and not merely those accused of or under suspicion of having committed a crime. No individual has greater power than the government itself,
nor has he the right unlawfully to seize any property belonging to another
person. If both the federal and state governments are prohibited from using
illegally seized property in a court proceeding against the individual whose
property has been wrongfully taken, then surely an individual seizing

130.

FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §12 (1968).

There was no similar language in the

Florida constitution of 1885.

131. Kelly v. State, 202 So. 2d 901, 903-04 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
132. Wells v. State, 168 So. 2d 787, 788 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
133. Italiano v. State, 141 Fla. 249, 255, 193 So. 48, 51, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 640 (1940).
134. Robertson v. State, 94 Fla. 770, 775, 114 So. 534, 536 (1927).
135. See, e.g., Talton v. Behncke, 106 F. Supp. 157, 159 (N.D. ILL), rev'd on other
grounds, 199 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1952).
136. Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 225, 14 N.W.2d 400, 405 (1944).
137. City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944, 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 3

1969]

ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

property should not be granted a greater privilege." 83 Another interpretation
of the fourth amendment sees the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures as a common law right, the amendment itself being merely
declaratory thereof. 39 Some view the amendment as a precautionary statement
of a lack of federal power 40 coupled with a rigidly restricted permission to
invade that common law right.' 41
A further reason for excluding illegally obtained evidence is that the
individual seizing the property, at least against the rights of the owner, has
no interest therein; he should therefore be unable to submit this property
into evidence in a legal proceeding against the wishes of the lawful owner. 42
Even in fire, health, and safety inspection cases, long an area where warrantless searches have been permitted,43 the United States Supreme Court has
recently held that it does not at this time feel that the fourth amendment
interests at stake are "merely peripheral." The Court expressly noted the
anomaly inherent in maintaining that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment only when the individual
is suspected of criminal behavior.14
The protection of individual privacy is another important consideration,'1 45 as is the promotion of a societal interest in the rational administration
of justice, where infractions of the law are minimized by refusing to reward
the actor who illegally seizes another's property by permitting its introduction
into evidence against the rightful owner. The position favoring the exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence from both criminal and noncriminal
proceedings is enhanced by basing it upon the right of individuals to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects from invasion by any other
individual, except through the vehicle of due process.
Persons favoring limiting the application of the exclusionary rule present
justification of their position that is no less persuasive. In the interest of a
fair trial, it is preferable not to try collateral issues because such would
circumvent the method by which alleged infractions of the law are investigated and prosecuted and would delay and confuse the trial'. 4 6 Objections
to offers of proof necessarily are directed to the relevancy, materiality, and
competency of the challenged evidence; the court should not of its own volition initiate the trial of collateral issues focusing upon the method by which
138. Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 162-63, 221 N.E.2d 622, 626 (C.P. Ohio

1966).
139. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S.
1 (1950); Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
140. This was made obligatory upon the states through the fourteenth amendment.
141. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
142. Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 163, 221 N.E.2d 622, 626 (C.P. Ohio

1966).

143. E.g., Frank v. State, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
144. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
145. The right to privacy under the federal constitution is as broad as the concept of
reasonableness - it has no fixed boundaries, but varies as the facts and circumstances
dictate. United States v. Baxter, 89 F. Supp. 732, 734 (E.D. Tenn. 1950), rev'd on other

grounds, Baxter v. United States, 188 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1951).
146.

8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2183 (McNaugbton rev. 1961).
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the evidence was procured. 47 The exclusion of the evidence would serve as
an indirect method of punishment by depriving the party who seeks to introduce it of some civil right by denying him the means by which it may be
proved.1 48 In so doing, the courts would be usurping the legislative function.
In addition, less extraordinary means of redress than absolute exclusion are
available to a party who has been injured by the admission of wrongfully
149
obtained evidence.
The effect that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence would have
on the process of truth ascertainment must also be examined. Evidence is
generally admitted when its probative value exceeds the attendant risk that
would result from its admission. It cannot realistically be said that the
nature of the means by which the evidence is acquired seriously affects the
reliability of that evidence. It must be conceded that the suppression of
evidence of any sort can only result in a suppression of the means by which
the factfinder seeks to ascertain the truth.
A further consideration is that the exclusionary rule may promote distrust by laymen toward the law and the courts. It is very difficult to explain
the nuances of constitutional interpretations of search and seizure law to
laymen, and they often do not appreciate the fact that the court is merely
insuring that everyone's rights are protected. Since a belief in the law and
the courts is an essential ingredient of our governmental system, this is a
serious criticism of the rule.
ALTERNATIVES

No state or federal statutes have been found that specifically exclude from
noncriminal proceedings evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Where such a
prohibition exists, it is based on decisional authority alone. The problem of
admissibility of such evidence could probably best be resolved through legislative enactment. Although this would not eliminate all problems in the
area, it should nonetheless minimize somewhat the present instability that
has been introduced by case law and reduce the difficulties encountered in
case preparation.
The Model Code of Evidence,150 embracing the fundamental concept
that all things relevant and logically probative are prima facie admissible
unless limitations are imposed by some other rule, does not even acknowledge
the existence of problems raised by illegally obtained evidence. In the
Uniform Rules of Evidence-' the issue is recognized, but no solution is
proposed; after stating the Model Code's basic premise, the Commissioners'
Note continues:
147.
214 N.C.
148.
149.
150.

151.
152.

1 52

Cluett v. Rosenthal, 100 Mich. 193, 198, 58 N.W. 1009, 1010 (1894); State v. McGee,
184, 185, 198 S.E. 616, 617 (1938).
8 J. WIGMORE, note 146 supra.
E.g., compensatory damages, punitive damages, criminal charges.
See generally MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942).

See generally 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN., Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953).
Id., rule 7.
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Illegally obtained evidence may be inadmissible on constitutional
grounds - not because it is irrelevant. Any constitutional questions
which may arise are inherent and may, of course, be raised independently of this rule.
The minimum expansion of the exclusionary rule should include in its
operation those types of proceedings, either judicial or administrative,
through which criminal sanctions of any sort attach. These would include
libel actions for forfeiture of property; proceedings to revoke a license, which
is required in order to engage in a business or profession; deportation proceedings; civil suits for penalties for violation of tax laws, zoning regulations,
and building codes; nuisance abatement suits; and any other proceedings that
are quasi-criminal. Such expansion of the scope of the exclusionary rule is
dictated by the fact that in each of these types of civil proceedings, some
determination must necessarily be made that a violation of the criminal law
has occurred. In such cases the parties involved must be afforded their full
complement of constitutional protections. Strict adherence to the rule under
Mapp should also be unequivocally applied to cases lacking criminal overtones, but where punitive damages are sought. This is because punitive
damages are sui generis and not compensatory in that they are assessed by
virtue of law whereby the sovereign punishes gross behavior for the good of
the public. 15 3 They depend not on the amount of damage, but rather on the
motive, purpose, and condition of the heart and mind of the wrongdoer,
analogous to the mens rea of criminal law. 5
Although not strictly required by Mapp or the fourth amendment, the
extension of the exclusionary rule to purely noncriminal proceedings would
be the better policy. Stability and uniformity, legitimate areas of both
legislative and judicial concern, would both be promoted by an across-theboard application of the rule. The abolition of the present ambivalence in
the law would also greatly aid counsel in preparation for trial. The societal
problems of preserving the sanctity and privacy of one's person and home
and the furtherance of the efficient administration of justice through the
elimination of the trial of collateral issues at the primary trial would both
receive favorable treatment under this option. A procedural requirement
governing the manner in which the collateral issue of the method by which
the evidence in question was procured must also be included to facilitate
uniform treatment under the rule.
T

Proposed Model Statute
The following model statute is suggested as an addition to the Uniform
Rules of Evidence.155 Rule seven provides that "except as otherwise provided
in these rules ...all relevant evidence is admissible."' 56 This rule is essential
153. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928, 933 (3d Cir. 1954).
154. Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576, 587 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997,
rehearingdenied, 346 U.S. 842 (1953).
155. 9A UNFORM LAws ANN. Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953).

156. Id., rule 7.
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to the general policy and plan of the Uniform Rules because it helps achieve
harmony and unity by wiping the slate clean and writing back onto it those
limitations and exceptions desired. A succinct statement of the above proposed
extension of Mapp's exclusionary rule should be one such exception:
Rule. Upon timely objection, evidence obtained by any act in
violation of the law shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any judicial
action, either civil or criminal, or in any administrative proceeding;
provided, however, that any such evidence shall be admissible in any
civil or criminal action, proceeding, or hearing against the person who
157
has, or is alleged to have, obtained such evidence in violation of the law.
Procedure. A motion to suppress evidence obtained by any act in
violation of law must be presented to the court within - days' 58 prior
to the trial or the objection will be waived, unless such objection does
not involve any disputed issues of fact, in which case it may first be made
at trial. The motion need not be heard before the trial, but should in any
event be heard out of the presence of the jury. A motion either before
or during trial shall be sufficient to preserve the objection for appeal. 159
CONCLUSION

No panacea appears for the present doctrinal and practical difficulties
encountered with the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in noncriminal proceedings. Conflicting interpretations of Mapp and the fourth
amendment have produced a nearly irreconcilable schism that is detrimental
to the individual, the law, and, ultimately, to society. Appropriate remedial
action is needed now. Whether such implementation will materialize, either
through the legislature or the judiciary, remains to be seen. Perhaps the best
suggestion as to how to solve this conflict lies, as has been suggested, in the
adoption of a uniform statute drafted with this specific problem in mind.
STEPHEN

A. SCOTr

157. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §4506 (McKinney 1963), dealing with eavesdropping evidence obtained in violation of certain enumerated sections prohibiting such acts.
158. The draftsmen in each state should fill in the time limit so as to conform to
existing state procedural rules.
159. The proposed procedure differs from that currently in force in Florida through
development of the case law, in that it requires the motion to be heard out of the presence
of the jury, and it does not require an objection to be made at trial to preserve rights on
appeal if the issue has already been raised by pretrial motion.
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